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Abstract and Introduction 
Corporate social responsibility is a key point of intersection at the junctures of business, society and 
government.1 It has first been conceived of as voluntary or self-regulatory measures that address, at 
least in part, complex issues that entail from corporate activity, whether they relate to direct or 
indirect forms of externalities or indeed the provision of proactive ‘good’ for social causes and 
objectives.  Global corporate activities are increasingly related to the provision of global public or 
collective goods,2 such provision no longer confined to public sector actors. This is arguably because 
the existence of the needs for global public goods is due to the externality-creating actions on the 
part of corporations that consume planetary resources and often fail to internalise social cost 
associated with their activities. Corporations suffer from a collective action problem in refraining 
from creating such externalities (as their competitors may persist in doing so) as well as redressing 
them- both are phenomena of the tragedy of the commons. Global public goods include 
environmental protection, sustainability in the use of planetary resources, adequate standards and 
protection of certain humanity conditions such as human rights, labour rights and communities, 
development, addressing the sub-optimal institutions in political economy (such as tax havens and 
corruption), and social transformations (such as consumerism).3 
Voluntary corporate responsibility may not be able to keep pace with the intensity and range of 
social demands, not to mention that the incentives that drive corporations often diverge from social 
expectations. The needs for these global public goods arise in a polycentric space of actors and 
stakeholders including states, international organisations and other public and private sector 
stakeholders. 4 States and law-makers are not necessarily able to command this space5 as the 
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1 Jeremy Moon, Nahee Kang and Jean-Pascal Gond, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and Government’ in David 
Coen et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Business and Government (Oxford: OUP 2010) at ch22; George A 
Steiner and John F Steiner, Business, Government and Society (7th ed, McGraw-Hill, 1994) for an overview in 
chapter 1. 
2 Inge Kaul, ‘Rethinking Public Goods and Global Public Goods’ in Inge Kaul (ed), Reflexive Governance for 
Global Public Goods (Cambridge: MIT Press 2012). 
3 For a comprehensive list of general literature on aspects of corporate social responsibility, please see 
Appendix 2. 
4 A taxonomy of governance actions is provided in chapter 4; 21-25, John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global 
Business Regulation (Oxford: OUP 2000); also broadly discussed in Larry Catá Backer, ‘Theorizing Regulatory 
Governance Within its Ecology: The Structure of Management in an Age of Globalization’ (2016) at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2783018; Peer Zumbansen, ‘The Conundrum of Corporate Social Responsibility: 
Reflections on the Changing Nature of Firms and States’ (2006) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=885373. 
5 Contemporary literature is generally acknowledging the rise of governance, which is a pluralistic concept that 
explains how spaces for problem solving and dialogue are populated by many actors, and not monopolised by 
transnational context for global multi-national corporations and the complexity of issues that affect 
a wide range of stakeholders increasingly elude state-based authority and mechanisms.  
Polycentric governance is an important paradigm du jour for analysing these issues. The importance 
of polycentric governance is reflected in the development of reflexive means of governance in law 
and policy to be discussed shortly. However, commentators increasingly observe a ‘juridification’ of 
corporate social responsibility and the extension of regulation and legalisation (in various forms). 6 
This is largely due to increasing pressure for change in corporate behaviour over years of slow 
achievements in the voluntary efforts led by the corporate sector. A ‘new’ regulatory technique, 
which is found in the EU Non-financial Reporting Directive 2014 implemented in the UK Companies 
Act 2006, and to a lesser extent in the UK’s Modern Slavery Act 2015 seems poised to draw together 
the polycentric forces of governance in a new way and yet leverage upon the power of state-backed 
regulation to achieve changes to corporate behaviour.7  
We suggest that such a new regulatory technique brings about new opportunities for corporate 
behaviour to be shaped by social input. This can incrementally result in cultural and behavioural 
change at corporations. Although this technique may appear ‘weak’ as corporate law is not 
significantly reformed, intrusive or ‘command’-forms of hard law need not be superior. What 
matters is whether behavioural change can be secured. This article makes a positive case for the 
social implications of the new mandatory disclosure obligation, although we acknowledge that this is 
not a silver bullet. The article does not take the view that other forms of hard law reforms such as in 
relation to corporate objective, directors’ duties etc8 are unnecessary. The complementarity 
between the case put forward in this article and other reform options is a subject for another 
discussion. 
In this article, Section A will discuss briefly the context for ‘juridification’ or ‘legalisation’ of issues of 
corporate social responsibility. Section B discusses the provisions in the EU Non-financial Disclosure 
Directive (and the equivalent in the UK Companies Act) and how procedural regulation for 
corporations is introduced via a form of mandatory disclosure. Section C discusses the UK’s Modern 
Slavery Act regime which employs less legalisation and compares this to the non-financial disclosure 
regime. Section D draws together a few broad critical reflections and concludes. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
regulators or governments. See Julia Black, ‘Critical Reflections on Regulation’ (2002) 27 Australian Journal of 
Legal Philosophy 1; Stephen P Osborne (ed), The New Public Governance?: Emerging Perspectives on the 
Theory and Practice of Public Governance (Oxford: Routledge, 2009). 
6 The term ‘juridification’ is used in Karin Buhmann, ‘Reflexive Regulation of CSR to Promote Sustainability: 
Understanding EU Public-Private Regulation on CSR Through the Case of Human Rights’ (2010) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1712801. Also see Reinhard Steurer, ‘ The Role of Governments in Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Characterising Public Policies on CSR in Europe’ (2010) 43 Policy Sciences 49-72 reflecting on 
increasing political interest and government involvement in CSR; Jette Knudsen, ‘Bringing the State Back in? US 
and UK Government Regulation of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in International Business’ (2014) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2541002 on the increasing social appetite for regulatory governance in CSR issues. 
7 Sections B and C. 
8 See excellent panoply of discussion in the European Company Law, Issue 11(2) (2014) featuring a special issue 
on sustainable companies. 
A. Legalising or Juridifying Corporate Social Responsibility 
Corporate social responsibility encompasses business, legal and beyond-legal dimensions such as 
ethics and citizenship.9 A responsible corporation is not only legally compliant, there is an 
expectation that responsibility extends beyond the legal dimension into the realm of being ‘good’, 
‘ethical’ or ‘moral’. 10 It may be argued that such ‘spirited responsibility’ lies in the domain of private 
preferences based on values and mission, and cannot be the subject of regulated behaviour. 
Drawing the line between what is regulable conduct and otherwise is a difficult one. This is because 
the lack of regulation of conduct is not always due to its inherent unregulability. The lack of 
regulation could be a result of lack of perceived necessity or political will. Indeed corporations could 
engage in voluntary conduct in order to prevent the regulation of an issue area. However, persistent 
gaps between social expectations and corporate social performance could in time culminate in some 
form of regulatory leadership, i.e what may be thought of as ‘good behaviour’ may become what is 
legally required conduct. 
The increasing juridification of corporate social responsibility is arguably a reflection of that 
development.  The following confluence of factors are in our view important: 
(a) Firm and market limitations in meeting social expectations, which have persisted over 
decades of corporate scandals; 
(b) Incremental and stealthy developments in corporate regulation which have over the years 
established the legitimacy of ‘regulatory capitalism’;11 and 
(c) A surge in international policy and social appetite for legalisation and regulation in the wake 
of the global financial crisis 2007-9.  
Firm and Market Limitations 
In the 1950s-70s, the rhetoric surrounding corporate responsibility was anchored in ethical and 
citizenship consciousness, bound up in the firm’s conception of its public-facing self and socially-
anchored personhood.12 The inward-looking nature of the firm has developed much more recently,13 
                                                          
9 Archie B Carroll, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ (1999) 38 Business and Society 268. 
10 Doreen McBarnet, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Beyond Law, Through Law, for Law’ (2009) at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1369305. 
11 See David Levi-Faur, ‘The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism’ (2005) 598 ANNALS of the Academy of 
Political Science 12; John Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008). 
12 Carroll (1999) above and William W Bratton, ‘The Separation of Corporate Law and Social Welfare’ (2017) 
Washington and Lee Law Review, forthcoming at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2927150. 
13 From the 1970s, with Friedman’s focus on firm-centred business performance as central to its social 
responsibility, and Jensen and Meckling’s agency-based view of corporate governance, see M Jensen and W 
Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure” (1976) 3 Journal 
of Financial Economics 305. 
as shareholder primacy has become a governing mantra for corporate management.14 Concern for 
social welfare fell away from the management radar since the 1980s as privatisation, economic 
liberalisation and financialisation took root.15  
The notion of corporate responsibility is today framed much more in alignment with the business 
case, 16 and responsible behaviour is shaped by fears of informal reputational sanctions in the form 
of media or activist pressure, or consumer aversion.17 Where the business case may be weaker or 
more nuanced, firm-led or industry-led initiatives in corporate responsibility may be absent or less 
effectual. 18  
We raise critically the example of the Equator principles,19 developed by leading banks to ensure 
that their project finance decisions are in line with the social responsibility concerns of the project.20 
The development of such Principles may be important in preventing intrusive regulations concerning 
the social aspects of project finance. The Principles oblige banks to monitor the borrower’s 
assessment of the social responsibility impact of the project and continuing management of such 
impact in consultation with stakeholders. However, the quality of monitoring undertaken by each 
bank, especially in the post-contractual phases, depends on the bank’s own processes21 which are 
not subject to independent review. Hence, the actual outcomes achieved for stakeholders affected 
by project finance are not subject to independent evaluation and accountability.22  
                                                          
14 The rise of shareholder primacy and its adverse impact on the wider responsibility consciousness of 
corporations is discussed in Iris H-Y Chiu, ‘Operationalising a Stakeholder Conception in Company Law’ (2017) 
Law and Financial Markets Review forthcoming and citations therein. 
15 William W Bratton, ‘The Separation of Corporate Law and Social Welfare’ (2017) Washington and Lee Law 
Review, forthcoming at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2927150. 
16 Cathie Jo Martin, ‘Social Policy and Business’ in David Coen et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Business and 
Government (Oxford: OUP 2010) at ch24. 
17 Regina Kreide, ‘The Obligations of Transnational Corporations in the Global Context. Normative Grounds, 
Real Policy, and Legitimate Governance’ (2006) 4 Ethics and Economics 1 at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1096102; 
David Vogel, ‘Taming Globalisation? Civil Regulation and Corporate Capitalism’ in David Coen et al (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of Business and Government (Oxford: OUP 2010) at ch20. 
18 Paul Calcott, ‘Mandated Self-Regulation: The Danger of Cosmetic Compliance’ (2010) 38 Journal of 
Regulatory Economics 167-179. On the use of ‘symbolic’ structures to signify compliance, without meaningfully 
observing the spirit of legislation see: Laruen B. Edelman, ‘Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: 
Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law,’ (1992) 97(6) American Journal of Sociology 1531. 
19 The Equator Principles (2013) at http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/ep3.  
20 Reputational concerns are the main incentives relevant to banks that adopted the Principles, see 
Christopher Wright and Alexis Rwabizambuga, Institutional Pressures, Corporate Reputation, and Voluntary 
Codes of Conduct: An Examination of the Equator Principles’ (2006) 111 Business and Society 89. 
21 Patrick Haack, Dennis Schoenborn and Christopher Wickert, ‘Exploring the Constitutive Conditions for a Self-
Energizing Effect of CSR Standards: The Case of the “Equator Principles”’ (October 2010) University of Zurich 
Institute of Organization and Administrative Science IOU Working Paper No 115 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1706267, 21. 
22 Critique can be found in Niamh O'Sullivan and Brendan O'Dwyer, ‘Stakeholder Perspectives on a Financial 
Sector Legitimation Process: The Case of NGOs and the Equator Principles’ (2009) 22 Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal 553-587; but see Bert Scholtens and Lammertjan Dam, ‘Banking on the Equator. Are 
Further, the relational paradigms between corporations and their various stakeholders may not 
culminate in sufficient pressure for corporate behavioural change. On the one hand, civil society 
pressures can be compelling for companies as their reputations and bottom lines can be adversely 
affected. For example the use of child labour by Nike’s Far-Eastern suppliers exploded in the media 
due to civil litigation spearheaded by Mike Kasky against Nike’s misrepresentations in its corporate 
responsibility reporting.23 However, Wen24 remarks that in a polycentric space, the governance 
power and capacity on the part of different constituents differ markedly, with businesses and states 
being relatively more powerful than consumers and civil society groups, hence skewing the nature of 
bottom-up initiatives. Hutchens25 also argues that the governance capacity of the social sphere is a 
complex issue as civil society actors are not always coordinated and can fork into different directions, 
undermining the strength of the movement, such as in Fairtrade. Further, economic incentives 
remain at play, and cost concerns may deter both buyers and producers in the fair-trade movement 
from adopting the relevant processes and certification requirements.  
Next, it may be argued that markets provide a form of governance. For example if key market 
players such as investors value a corporation’s social responsibility profile highly, pressure can be 
brought to bear on corporate priorities and conduct.26 Institutional investors are increasingly 
embracing corporate social responsibility as a key tenet for their investment decisions,27 but many 
commentators see investors as still being focused on traditional financial returns, and do not play an 
active role in championing social responsibility as such.28 That said, changes to investment strategies, 
albeit incremental, such as adhering to an Index that values social responsibility (for eg the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Banks that Adopted the Equator Principles Different from Non-Adopters?’ (2007) 35 World Development 1307, 
but the perception of responsible conduct is measured in a more ‘proxy’ manner, relating to shareholder 
perception and existence of policies. 
23 Kasky v Nike Inc 45 p.3d 243 (Cal 2002). 
24 Shuangge Wen, ‘The Cogs and Wheels of Reflexive Law ± Business Disclosure under the Modern Slavery Act’ 
(2016) 43 Journal of Law and Society 327; W. Scheuerman, `Reflexive Law and the Challenges of Globalisation' 
(2001) 9 Journal of Political Philosophy 81. 
25 Anna Hutchens, ‘Defiance in the Social Sphere: The Complexity Of Risk Regulation In The Case Of Fair Trade’ 
in Bettina Lange (ed), From Economy to Society? Perspectives on Transnational Risk Regulation (Emerald 
Insight 2014) at 163. 
26 For eg see Benjamin Richardson who has written prolifically on making a case for investors to be socially 
responsible as part of their legal duties, see Benjamin J Richardson, Socially Responsible Investment Law: 
Regulating the Unseen Polluters (New York: Oxford University Press 2008), in turn exerting pressure upon 
corporations to meet those expectations. 
27 United Nations, Principles of Responsible Investment http://www.unpri.org/about-pri/the-six-principles/. 
28 Joakim Sandberg, ‘What are your Investments Doing Right Now?’ in Wim Vanderkerckhove and others (eds), 
Responsible Investment in Times of Turmoil (Dordrecht: Springer 2011), 165ff; Carlos Joly, ‘Reality and the 
Potential of Responsible Investment’ and Riikka Sievänen, ‘Responsible Investment by Pension Funds after the 
Financial Crisis’in Wim Vanderkerckhove and others (eds), Responsible Investment in Times of Turmoil 
(Dordrecht: Springer 2011), 193, 93ff respectively; showing that most pension funds never really developed 
novel or unique strategies for SRI. 
FTSE4Good) could culminate in market messages to companies.29 There is an increasing trend 
towards relying on investors, which are largely institutions regarded as representing the saving 
citizenry, to galvanise change in corporate behaviour.30 Such influence however tends to be 
incremental and inherently subject to contesting objectives.31 The ‘stewardship’32 of institutions is 
far from addressing public goods in a consistent and stable manner.33  
On the whole corporations have made some but slow progress in addressing the gap between 
corporate social performance and social expectations.34 Where gaps persist between voluntary 
corporate social performance and social expectations, the introduction of regulatory governance 
may be appropriate. Regulatory leadership in governing corporate behaviour has been incremental 
but persistent, a phenomenon described as ‘regulatory capitalism’ (see below). Regulatory 
governance benefits from being able to frame socially expected standards of behaviour in public 
interest, capable of consistent application and enforceable by the means of a coercive order. Its 
potential drawback may however be its ‘one size fits all’ nature. The next Section discusses briefly 
milestones in contemporary corporate regulation and the significant surge in social appetite for 
corporate regulation post the global financial crisis 2007-9. 
The Evolution of Corporate Regulation 
                                                          
29 Luc Renneboog, Jenke ter Horst and Chendi Zhang, ‘Socially Responsible Investments: Methodology, Risk 
Exposure and Performance’ (June 2007) ECGI Finance Working Paper No 175/2007 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=985267 ; Michael L Barnett and Robert M Salomon, 
‘Beyond Dichotomy: The Curvilinear Relationship between Social Responsibility and Financial Performance’ 
(2006) 27 Strategic Management Journal 1101  Peer C Osthoff and Alexander Kempf, ‘The Effect of Socially 
Responsible Investing on Portfolio Performance’ (2005) 13 European Financial Management 908. 
30 The vision of fiduciary capitalism initially mooted by JP Hawley and AT Williams, The Rise of Fiduciary 
Capitalism: How Institutional Investors Can Make Corporate America More Democratic (University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2000). But this vision has been questioned by commentators who view institutions and 
their fund managers as being subject to myopia and agency problems, see Ronald J Gilson and Jeffrey N 
Gordon, ‘Agency Capitalism: Further Implications of Equity Intermediation’ (2014) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2359690; L Randall Wray, ‘Money Manager Capitalism and the Global Financial 
Crisis’ (2009) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1478508. 
31 Scepticism also expressed in Beate Sjafell, ‘Regulating Companies as if the World Matters: Reflections from 
the Ongoing Sustainable Companies Project’ (2012) 47 Wake Forest Law Review 113. 
32 UK Stewardship Code 2016 that sets out engaged but constructive behaviour expected of institutions. 
33 The engagement of different types of institutional investors with their companies is fleshed out in Roger M 
Barker and Iris H-Y Chiu, Investment Management and Corporate Governance in the Financial Economy 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2017), forthcoming. 
34 Empirical research found some voluntary programs to be largely rhetorical in nature, where corporations 
give the impression of outreach and engagement but in fact do little to change their social responsibility 
performance. See Cary Coglianese and Jennifer Nash, ‘Performance Track's Postmortem: Lessons from the Rise 
and Fall of EPA's 'Flagship' Voluntary Program’ (2014) 38 Harvard Environmental Law Review 1; David Vogel, 
‘The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct: Achievements and Limitations’ (2010) 49 Business and 
Society 68. 
Regulating corporations is as old as corporate capitalism. Since the great privatisations and 
modernisation of Western economies from the 1980s,35 corporations have played a leading role in 
economic activities as private actors and in markets. Nevertheless, the rise of the regulatory state is 
commensurate with the expansion of the corporate footprint, a phenomenon termed as ‘regulatory 
capitalism’.36 Regulatory capitalism refers to the existence of governance frameworks that shape 
economic functioning and protect certain political or social values, representing a landscape where 
economic functions and needs are facilitated, and where distributive or social goals are also 
pursued.37 In other words, the public character of governance continues to exist extensively with the 
economic activities led by the private sector. 
Corporate regulation is a powerful means to change corporate behaviour where such behaviour 
adversely affects the efficient working of markets or other social and public interest.38 The 
development of corporate regulation in the UK can be traced to the litany of corporate scandals 
since the South Sea Bubble of the early eighteenth century.39 Often increasing legalisation signals 
policy-makers’ resolve to respond to social pressures that private corporations have failed to 
adequately address.40 Corporate regulation reforms have taken the form of corporate duties such as 
in securities regulation as well as other external public interest regulation such as health and safety, 
product liability, occupier’s liability and more recently compulsory occupational pensions provision.41 
For example, corporate scandals in the UK in the 1990s involving financial reporting have led to 
reforms in both corporate reporting and governance in publicly listed companies.42  Scandals in the 
                                                          
35 Claude V Chang, Privatisation and Development: Theory, Policy and Evidence (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006) at 
chapters 1 and 2; Florencio López de Silanes, Andrei Schleifer and Robert W Vishny, ‘Privatization in the United 
States’ (1997) RAND Journal of Economics 447 at 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/shleifer/files/privatization_us.pdf; Dennis Swann, The Retreat of the State: 
Deregulation and Privatisation in the UK and US (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988); Richard Heffernan, ‘UK 
Privatisation Revisited: Ideas and Policy Change, 1979–92’ (2005) 76 The Political Quarterly 264. 
36 David Levi-Faur, ‘The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism’ (2005) 598 The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 12. 
37 John Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2008), 4-29. 
38 See Michael Moran, ‘The Rise of the Regulatory State’ in David Coen et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Business and Government (Oxford: OUP 2010) at ch16. 
39 Mandatory requirements in early company law regarding formation of joint stock companies and 
transparency from the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 to the Companies Act 1862. 
40 Such as workmen’s compensation in the UK since 1897.  
41 Not to mention the ambiguity about labour law in terms of being part of or external to ‘corporate law’. The 
literature on this is too vast to cite, but see Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, ‘Legal Development of Corporate 
Responsibility’ in Klaus J Hopt and Gunther Teubner (eds), Corporate Governance and Directors’ Liabilities 
(Berlin/NY: W de Gruyter, 1985) on an overview of the nature of company law and reform in corporate 
regulation in the UK.  
42 The Cadbury Code of Corporate Governance introduced in 1992 in response to the failures of Polly Peck, 
Maxwell and BCCI. 
UK involving mass deaths as a result of industrial or corporate accidents culminated in the 
enactment of the Corporate Homicide Act 2007.43  
There has however been marked resistance to reform company law to engage with wider or social 
responsibility, as company law remains a private, consensual paradigm.44 This has resulted in 
limitations in advancing corporate legal responsibility such as liability for enterprise harms. 45 
Moreover, the limitations of corporate regulation are unravelled in the context of multi-national 
corporations that have transnational footprint and may not be adequately controlled by any one 
state’s regulatory controls.46 Besides the transnational corporation may undermine states’ resolve to 
adequately regulate them, as states engage in regulatory competition to attract their investment.47 
Transnational corporations have coalesced incredible influence as epistemic groups that influence 
knowledge production relating to issue areas and policy thinking,48 as well as lobbying power.49  
Despite some achievements in corporate regulation that delineate expectations of corporate 
accountability and behaviour, it remains challenging to compel corporations to internalise 
responsibilities for social externalities or promote stakeholder inclusion.50 However, non-traditional 
and reflexive forms of governance51 have been increasingly introduced for companies, especially 
                                                          
43 CMV Clarkson, ‘Kicking Corporate Bodies and Damning Their Souls’ (1996) 59 Modern Law Review 557; David 
Ormerod and Richard Taylor, ‘Legislative Comment: The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 
2007’ (2008) Criminal Law Review 589. 
44 Wedderburn (1985), above on the insularity of company law. 
45 Such as Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433, whose position is not significantly advanced by the 
narrow decision in Chandler v Cape plc [2012] EWCA Civ 525. 
46Janet Dine, ‘Transnationals out of Control’ in Governance of Corporate Groups (Cambridge University Press 
2000, 2006); Larry Cata Backer, ‘The Autonomous Global Enterprise: On the Role of Organizational Law Beyond 
Asset Partitioning and Legal Personality’ (2006) 41 Tulsa Law Journal at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=880730. 
47 Colin Crouch, ‘The Global Firm: The Problem of the Giant Firm in Democratic Capitalism’ in David Coen et al 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Business and Government (Oxford: OUP 2010) at ch6; but see Horst Eidenmüller, 
‘The Transnational Law Market, Regulatory Competition, and Transnational Corporations’ (2011) 18 Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies 707 who expounds on the powerful forces of regulatory competition but argues 
that regulatory competition allows corporations to escape from bad law as a result of poor policy choice in 
states, and should overall be supported. 
48 Eg Katherine E Smith, Gary Fooks, Anna B Gilmore and Jeff Collin, ‘Corporate Coalitions and Policy Making in 
the European Union: How and Why British American Tobacco Promoted ‘‘Better Regulation’’’ (2015) 40 
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 325 on how the tobacco industry influenced policy-making 
frameworks in terms of economic-based assessments. 
49 Eg see David L Levy and Aseem Prakash, ‘Bargains Old and New: Multinational Corporations in Global 
Governance’ (2003) 5 Business and Politics 131-150. 
50 Resisted by the private nature of company law, see for eg Mark Pendras, ‘Law and the Political Geography of 
US Corporate Regulation’ (2011) 15 Regulation, Space and Polity 1, arguing that the efficiency perspective of 
the corporate organisation is often used as a shield against intrusive corporate law reform. 
51 also Gunther Teubner, ‘Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law’ (1983) 17 Law and Society 
Review 239. 
where traditional command-and-control techniques in regulating corporations are inappropriate.52 
These to an extent mitigate the lack of achievement in company law reform.  
The Growth of Reflexive Governance Techniques in Corporate Regulation 
Reflexive techniques in regulation and governance have grown to secure the elusive goal of 
corporate behavioural change. Reflexive techniques may involve (a) a plurality of actors in designing 
governance thinking and techniques, and/or in securing compliance or enforcement at national or 
transnational levels; (b) a spectrum of norms, standards, arrangements or expectations along a soft-
hard continuum, sometimes backed by law or regulatory enforcement and (c) a blurring of the 
distinction between public or private in terms of the source of and capacity for providing governance.  
Ford terms such regulatory techniques as ‘flexible regulation’,53  while Gilad uses the term ‘process-
oriented’ regulation to describe this family of regulatory techniques.54 For example, principles or 
outcomes-based regulation55 can be introduced where certain known outcomes are prescribed in 
regulation while leaving a certain amount of discretion and responsibility to firms to take actions to 
ensure the attainment of those outcomes. However, outcomes-based regulation may be 
inappropriate where the certainty of outcomes cannot be defined, and process-based regulation 
may be more apt.  
Process-based regulation focuses more on systems and internal procedures which approximate to 
soundness of control and governance, where outcomes may be undefined or heterogenous. For 
example, ‘management-based regulation’56 emphasises organisational innovation and procedures to 
meet public regulatory goals. ‘Meta-regulation’57  refers to a regulatory approach that empowers 
and enhances the capacity of corporations to self-regulate, but connects ‘the private justice of the 
internal management system’ to the ‘public justice of accountability’.58 Process-based regulatory 
                                                          
52 See discussion in Iris H-Y Chiu and Anna Donovan, ‘A New Milestone in Corporate Regulation: Procedural 
Legalisation, Standards of Transnational Corporate Behaviour and Lessons from Financial Regulation and Anti-
Bribery Regulation’ (2017) Journal of Corporate Law Studies, forthcoming. 
53 Cristie Ford, ‘Macro- and Micro-Level Effects on Responsive Financial Regulation’ (2011) 44 University of 
British Columbia Law Review 589. 
54 Sharon Gilad, “It Runs in the Family: Meta-regulation and its Siblings” (2010) 4 Regulation and Governance 
485. 
55 Mary Condon, ‘Canadian Securities Regulation and the Global Financial Crisis’ The Walter S Owen Lecture, 
University of British Columbia, 26 March 2009. 
56 Cary Coglianese and David Lazer, “Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to 
Achieve Public Goals”  (2003) 37 Law and Society Review 691. 
57 Cary Coglianese  and Evan Mendelson, “Meta-Regulation and Self-Regulation”in R Baldwin, M Cave, and M 
Lodge (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (Oxford University Press, Oxford) , pp. 146–168; Christine 
Parker, The Open Corporation (Cambridge: CUP 2002); “Meta-Regulation: Legal Accountability for Corporate 
Social Responsibility” (2006) at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=942157; Colin Scott, 
“Regulating Everything: From Mega- To Meta-Regulation” (2012) 60 Administration 61. 
techniques are often collectively known as ‘new governance.’59 New governance regulatory 
techniques are essentially reflexive and co-opt the regulated entities to develop effective 
compliance practices. 
Increasingly we see corporate regulation framed as process-based regulation as corporations are 
mandated to change internal structures and governance, in a bid towards changing corporate 
behaviour and outcomes. This has been adopted in the UK’s Bribery Act 2010 to combat corrupt 
business practices, Criminal Finances Act 2017 to combat corporate complicity in money laundering 
and financial crime, as well as tax evasion, and the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to deal with abject 
labour and supply chain practices. These techniques circumvent the need to intrude upon the 
‘private nature’ of company law, yet attempt to institute public interest expectations of internal 
governance and control.  
However, reflexive techniques in regulation have suffered various criticisms. First, process-based 
regulatory techniques may result in excessive proceduralisation, disengaged from the ultimate 
purpose of changing corporate behaviour.60 Firm implementation of procedures may be mechanistic 
and “box-ticking”61 in nature, fostering merely cosmetic forms of compliance.62  
Further, firm procedures, especially if presented as complex systems and technologies, provides an 
impression of endeavour, credibility and legitimacy and thus justify themselves, creating a form of 
legal endogeneity. Legal endogeneity occurs when the systems and procedures implemented by 
firms are taken as capable of defining what the needs of substantive justice or regulation are.63 Legal 
endogeneity may obscure whether there is real engagement with the corporate social responsibility 
issues at hand or real changes in corporate behaviour.  
Increasing Legalisation in Refining New Governance Techniques 
Reflexive governance techniques are susceptible to compromising regulatory leadership altogether if 
they become excessively ‘delegated’ to the firm, tantamount to being self-regulatory in nature. Such 
critique64 against reflexive governance techniques intensified in the aftermath of the global financial 
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61 Michael Power, Organised Uncertainty (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007) at 164. 
62 Kimberly Krawiec, ‘Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance’ (2003) 81 Washington 
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63  Russell J Funk and Daniel G Hirschman, “Endogenous Legal Change: How Organizations Re-Shaped Glass-
Steagall” (University of Michigan Working Paper 2012). 
64 See Cristie Ford, ‘New Governance in the Teeth of Human Frailty: Lessons from Financial Regulation’ (2010) 
Wisconsin Law Review 441. 
crisis 2007-9 which saw the loss of social confidence in modern capitalism65 and the financial sector. 
An adjustment in the design of reflexive regulatory techniques has been taking place. The public-
private mix in reflexive governance, which leaned heavily towards delegated self-regulatory efforts 
by the private sector has become characterised by greater intensity in public sector-backed 
governance.66 
There is expanding appetite67 for subjecting corporate behaviour to greater intensity in regulatory 
governance. For example, there is a markedly sharper social appetite for the regulation of banks68 in 
relation to their internal governance and external conduct. Combatting corporate tax evasion more 
generally is also a post-crisis initiative.69 
Hard law is enjoying a rejuvenation of credibility. 70 This is consistent with the cycles of regulation 
that follow the culmination of corporate failings and crises.71 Corporate regulation is able to espouse 
standards of behaviour and therefore chimes with social expectations, and to an extent, the needs 
for corporate compliance could change corporate behaviour.72 Corporate regulation represents a 
coalescence of social hope and political resolve, but its effectiveness in securing real and 
fundamental corporate behavioural change remains a challenging issue. State-backed authority is 
neither a panacea nor is substitutive for the range of governance dimensions that other actors bring. 
Hence, what we concomitantly observe greater legalisation in the form of adjustments to the new 
governance regulatory techniques instead of a resumption of command-and-control. 
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It is in this context we evaluate the recent mandatory disclosure reforms in the EU and UK with 
regard to social responsibility issues. Essentially mandatory disclosure is used as a conduit to 
prescribe the institutionalisation of internal processes in order to improve a firm’s social 
responsibility consciousness and accountability. This technique in particular leverages upon the 
polycentricity of the governance landscape and provides opportunities for social governance to 
support regulatory obligations. 
B. Disclosure-based Procedural Regulation in the EU and UK 
Mandatory disclosure for corporations in the EU and UK has always been based on investors’ needs. 
Early initiatives in the UK that incorporate aspects of social responsibility are based firmly on that 
tenet.73 The UK has since 2006 required the directors’ business review, a narrative report, to contain 
information on how environment and stakeholder issues relate to business performance.74 The EU 
has to date extensively harmonised corporate reporting requirements including financial and 
narrative reporting.75 The narrative reporting requirements relate to qualitatively explaining 
business performance and risks. 76 Narrative reporting in the EU and UK has, until the 
transformational reform introduced in the EU Non-financial Disclosure Directive 2014, been focused 
on shareholder-centric needs in relation to evaluating financial performance and viability.77 
In 2014 the EU introduced the Non-financial Disclosure Directive78 inserting Article 19a into the 2013 
Directive (referred to above) that deals with corporate reporting obligations. Article 19a requires 
large undertakings that are public-interest entities (exceeding on their balance sheet dates the 
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criterion of the average number of 500 employees during the financial year) to include in the 
management report a non-financial statement containing information to the extent necessary for 
an understanding of the undertaking's development, performance, position and impact of its 
activity, relating to, as a minimum, environmental, social and employee matters, respect for 
human rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters. This is transposed in the UK which now requires 
the directors’ Strategic Report, i.e. the narrative report produced by the Board, to include a non-
financial information statement that contains the above-highlighted information.79 
The EU’s and UK’s new mandatory disclosure requirement arguably relates to reviewing the 
corporation’s social responsibility and stakeholder relations as standalone matters, and not only as 
matters relevant to the business case. We take a different position from that argued by Choudhury80 
in relation to the primary relevance and utility of social disclosure to investors. Investors may not be 
uninterested in these matters,81 but in these reforms, the mandatory disclosure is not constrained or 
shaped by a shareholder-centric focus. These reforms pertain to connecting the needs of social 
justice to corporate regulation.82  
The Directive states clearly in its preamble83 that the non-financial reporting relates to needs in 
improving the accountability of corporate social responsibility relevant to stakeholders such as 
consumers besides investors. This distinguishes the mandatory non-financial information statement 
from other shareholder-centric financial and non-financial reporting referred to above. We arguably 
see the new mandatory reporting requirements as introducing a new kind of corporate transparency 
framed towards social and public accountability. A caveat that can be introduced here is that upon 
the UK’s departure from the EU, the preamble may no longer apply in the UK’s interpretation of the 
nature of the non-financial information statement. 
However, it can be argued that as the non-financial information statement is required ‘to be 
included’ in the ‘management report’ (i.e. the UK’s directors’ Strategic Report), the statement takes 
after the character of the Report, which is non-financial reporting supporting the company’s 
financial transparency. Further, as the non-financial disclosure in the Strategic report is guided by a 
standard of materiality,84 which refers to whether the disclosure matters for the investment 
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decisions of a reasonable investor,85 the non-financial information statement could be governed by 
the same shareholder-centric standard.  
We however support the contrary position that the non-financial information statement is distinct, 
and argue that the materiality standard recommended by the Financial Reporting Council may 
require revision. It is also to be noted that the Global Reporting Initiative has introduced a concept 
of materiality for environment and social impact in order to guide management in making social 
responsibility disclosures in accordance with the GRI’s Reporting Standards. Hence it is not necessary 
that ‘materiality’ should be a shareholder-centric benchmark.86 
Support for the distinctness of the non-financial statement can be found in the prescribed matters to 
be disclosed. These matters relate ultimately to evaluating a company’s social responsibility 
performance, and can be distinguished from shareholder-focused financial or non-financial reporting. 
The Directive provides that the non-financial information statement must disclose: 
(a) a brief description of the group's business model; 
(b) a description of the policies pursued by the group in relation to [the social responsibility] matters 
[mentioned above], including due diligence processes implemented; 
(c) the outcome of those policies; 
(d) the principal risks related to those matters linked to the group's operations including, where 
relevant and proportionate, its business relationships, products or services which are likely to cause 
adverse impacts in those areas, and how the group manages those risks; 
(e) non-financial key performance indicators relevant to the particular business. 
The UK transposition differs slightly by specifying that each of the matters to be disclosed is ‘a 
description’ in nature. This may raise certain implications in our interpretational study to be shortly 
discussed. 
First, the non-financial information statement must contain a description of the company or in the 
case of a consolidated statement for groups, the group’s business model. The description is qualified 
by the relevance of such information to the development, performance, position and impact of its 
activity, relating to, as a minimum, environmental, social and employee matters, respect for 
human rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters. This requirement compels companies to identify 
the aspects of its business activity that relate to the social responsibility and stakeholder areas above, 
not the converse. Companies therefore need to have regard for their social responsibility 
performance as such and not merely relegate the relevance of social responsibility performance to 
business and financial performance.  
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Further, the company must disclose a description of the policies pursued in relation to the social 
responsibility and stakeholder matters and any due diligence processes implemented. It is curious to 
note that the requirement of disclosure pertains to a description of the company’s policies, meaning 
that company policies are not required to be laid bare as such to the public. The privacy of company 
policies is preserved and only a description need be provided. It may be argued that such a 
formulation for disclosure could encourage rather broadly-framed narratives in general terms. 
However, further disclosure requirements in relation to due diligence processes and the outcomes 
of policies may mitigate against the risk of broadly framed or meaningless disclosure.  
Procedural Regulation- Due Diligence Processes 
In requiring disclosure of the company’s due diligence processes, the transparency requirement in 
the Directive should not be taken at face value. This transparency requirement indeed introduces an 
indirect procedural requirement for the company to institute due diligence processes, and should 
not be regarded as regulatory technique focused on information. In order to make disclosure of such 
procedures, companies are compelled to establish them. Mandatory disclosure indirectly introduces 
a form of procedural regulation.  
It is possible that companies can choose to make disclosure of their due diligence procedures in 
broad terms. In particular, the disclosure obligation in the UK refers to a description of the 
procedures. General non-financial reporting (under Arts 19 and 20 of the EU Directive on Corporate 
Transparency of 2013 or the UK’s Strategic Report in s414A, Companies Act 2006) already requires 
reporting on companies’ risk management and internal control. Thus, companies can subsume 
reporting on due diligence procedures for social responsibility into risk management disclosure 
generally.87 This would be a relatively incremental way of responding to the new disclosure 
obligation. 
We do not think such minimal treatment would pass muster. Stakeholders, as well as shareholders 
who are not apathetic to such disclosure may find such minimal treatment to be non-compliant, as 
one can interpret the disclosure obligation as relating to due diligence procedures in relation to each 
relevant social responsibility area. We see this form of procedural regulation as intending to achieve 
the effect of compelling companies to demonstrate change and reform to their internal procedural 
and governance frameworks, as a proxy for demonstrating behavioural change. Further, the 
itemisation in the disclosure obligation in relation to: company due diligence procedures, non-
financial performance indicators for the social responsibility matters and evaluation of outcomes- all 
require a certain engagement with substantive reporting whose quality will be scrutinised. 
As procedural change and response is needed, companies may find it appealing to look to due 
diligence frameworks that enjoy social endorsement in order to enhance the substantive quality of 
their implementation and disclosure. Civil society initiatives offer ready-made and credible 
templates and frameworks at the input stage for companies.  
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There are various third-party frameworks already in existence that provide guidance on how due 
diligence procedures can be constructed and disclosed. In fact the existence of these frameworks 
provide a benchmark against which to measure corporate disclosure, and corporations may be 
incentivised to adopt them as being ‘bonded’ to them could be socially appealing. The inability of 
corporate regulation to be excessively prescriptive about due diligence procedures, given the need 
for such procedures to be context-specific, provides an opportunity for civil society groups to offer 
bottom-up initiatives to engage with corporations, giving rise to a form of pluralistic procedural 
regulation. Regulation, civil society and the regulated corporation can engage in a dynamic manner 
to achieve changes in corporate behaviour.88 
In terms of environmental protection, companies may look to the ISO14001 process-based standard 
for environmental management, which has attained a credible stature. Prakash in his detailed 
examination of ISO14001 explains that the standard comprises of various management processes 
that have to be established in a company, including an environment policy and its governance, an 
environment plan including stakeholder engagement, environmental objectives such as setting 
targets and dedicating resources, environmental impact assessments and the organisational 
management of environmental issues including integration into strategic management.89 Companies 
are independently audited in order to be certified for the standard, and empirical research shows 
that the adoption of the ISO14001 has improved the environmental consciousness and protection 
performance on the part of companies.90 
Human rights due diligence has also been developed following the introduction of the UN Guiding 
Principles that seek to operationalise human rights protection and redress of human rights breaches 
by states and corporations.91 For example, commentators have identified contexts for due diligence, 
such as in early stages of contractual negotiations and procurement, and in on-going monitoring and 
review.92 In particular, leading due diligence standards have been produced by SHIFT and Mazars,93 
in the form of systematic diagnostic questions designed to lead companies into thinking about and 
instituting relevant processes.94 Companies are guided to consider their management, governance 
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94 The SHIFT framework for human rights due diligence in high risk contexts guide companies through 
identifying the  context of risks such as in conflict areas or business relationships with partners with certain 
track records, business activities of a sensitive nature such as over water resources or in the presence of 
vulnerable groups such as aboriginal communities. Companies are then guided to identify the types of risks 
and capacity to manage such risks, including information collation, senior management governance, 
embedding in enterprise risk management systems, the development of indicators to measure 
performance, and stakeholder engagement, including allowing stakeholders to push information to 
companies.95 Harrison also proposes that human rights due diligence can be further made more 
robust in companies if they seek third party independent verification, so standards in relation to 
such verification or assurance would be a next step in development.96 
In terms of labour standards, the unifying core of labour rights and standards under the various 
International Labor Organization conventions have helped civil society groups to establish standards 
that help companies forge appropriate management processes and codes of conduct. Third party 
organisations are able to provide certification programs in order to verify companies’ labour 
management practices including in supply chains.97 Large retailers such as Gap, Nike and Reebok 
have established management processes according to the ILO standards, while organisations such as 
Social Accountability, The Fair Labor Association and the Dutch Clean Clothes Campaign provide 
certification programs for companies on a voluntary basis. For example the Social Accountability 
organisation’s SA8000 certification processes comprise of reviews of documentation, working 
practices, employee interview responses, and operational records and on site visits before awarding 
the certification.98 
Anti-bribery and corruption is now part of corporate compliance in the UK,99 and the Ministry of 
Justice issued 6 guiding principles100 on the implementation of what may be regarded as ‘adequate 
procedures’ in preventing bribery. However, companies may find useful the Checklist developed by 
Transparency International that systematically directs companies to establish policies and 
management processes that would meet the broadly worded procedural requirements in the 
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Bribery Act and MOJ Guidance. The Checklist deals with governance, policy setting and 
implementation, operational processes, training, external communications such as complaints and 
advice, internal control, information collation and reporting, membership in collective organisations 
and specific risk areas such as sponsorships, charitable and political donations, business relationships, 
contractors and suppliers, investments, joint ventures and consortia.101 Further, international 
organisations such as the UN Office for Drugs and Crime, World Bank and the OECD102 have also 
collectively produced a handbook to provide procedural insight and case study examples of good 
and poor practices. 
Finally in general social responsibility, companies can look to the ISO26000 standard which is a 
guidance and not a certification standard. ISO26000 introduces a harmonised conception of social 
responsibility issues, largely drawn from global social responsibility standards such as the UN Global 
Compact, ILO conventions etc, and brings together an integrated approach towards governance, 
information collection and awareness, training, communications and stakeholder engagement.103 
The integrated approach has been criticised to pander excessively to the business case,104 and it 
remains to be seen if the practices of social responsibility could so easily converge or be ‘integrated’, 
given that the due diligence needs in different issue areas may be rather different. 
Mandatory disclosure with regard to due diligence procedures and implementation by companies 
introduces an indirect form of procedural regulation that opens up to public scrutiny and 
accountability. This accountability framework ushers in an opportunity for civil society and bottom-
up initiatives to engage with companies, providing practical advice or guidance in implementing due 
diligence procedures. This form of engagement has the potential to promote a reflexive form of new 
governance where procedural regulation interacts with civil society governance in order to change 
corporate behaviour.  
Procedural Regulation- Non-financial Key Performance Indicators and Outcomes 
Art 19a of the EU Directive 2014 requires mandatory disclosure of companies’ ‘non-financial key 
performance indicators’ and ‘outcomes’ of their social responsibility policies. Section 414CA of the 
UK Companies Act refers to a ‘description’ of such outcomes. It can be argued that section 414CA 
may only require a narrative overview of what the company’s policies have achieved. We think the 
difference in language may be of some importance, however, there is a limit to how minimalist an 
interpretation can be made of section 414CA. This is because the section, like under the EU Directive, 
is aimed at focusing companies on measuring and evaluating social performance. This requires a 
change in orientation and practices. 
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In terms of non-financial key performance indicators, companies may, if left to themselves, develop 
these as being complementary to financial performance indicators. As the non-financial information 
statement must include ‘non-financial key performance indicators relevant to the business’, it can 
be argued that the non-financial reporting of social responsibility matters ultimately relate to a 
wider understanding of business performance after all.105 Nevertheless, it could also be counter-
argued that ‘relevant to the business’ refers to the social responsibility or stakeholder issues 
relevant to the company, i.e. arising out of the company’s operations. Hence companies should 
interpret this requirement as relating to the social performance of the business and not the social 
performance of the business as mediated through the business case.  
Civil society initiatives have taken steps towards developing more concrete indicators focused on 
social responsibility performance, therefore challenging the focus of businesses in terms of what 
they measure. Boesso106 argues, in a comparative study of CSR reporting by US and Italian 
companies that predate the Non-financial Disclosure Directive 2014, that social responsibility 
matters identified in internationally recognised reporting templates such as the Global Reporting 
Initiative’s standards often form the basis for developing non-financial key performance indicators. 
Companies develop measures for the matters specified by the GRI’s Sustainability Reporting 
Standards.107 The Standards identify clearly what is to be measured and reported under ‘Economic’, 
‘Environment’ and ‘Social’ categories. For example, under ‘Economic’, anti-corruption achievements 
are to be reported, amongst other matters, such achievements are measured in relation to a list of 
items including extensiveness of training and intensity of internal risk management. Under 
‘Environment’, firms are required to measure and report on items such as biodiversity and 
conservation of water resources. Further breakdown of what is to be measured in biodiversity and 
water conservation includes extent of water recycling, impact on biodiversity such as species 
reduction or habitat conversion etc. The high level of specificity and prescription in the GRI 
Reporting Standards provide a good proxy for the development non-financial key performance 
indicators in the relevant areas of economic, environment or social responsibility. 
It is queried if disclosure of ‘outcomes’ would relate to formal impact assessments108 that companies 
should carry out in all social responsibility matters referred to in the Directive. Impact assessments 
would compel companies to substantively and procedurally engage with their social impact and 
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strategic decisions, and in our view would be optimal practice. These may however create rather 
costly burdens for companies. Further, as Harrison points out,109 impact assessments may only be 
credible if carried out with the involvement of independent third parties, so cost in relation to 
obtaining verification or assurance may also be significant. We are of the view that disclosure of 
outcomes (which could be regarded as being more comprehensive in the Directive’s wording than 
the UK’s version of ‘description’ of outcomes) does not necessarily entail the production of impact 
assessments. However, as the non-financial disclosure statement can be subject to securities 
litigation by investors, the support of impact assessments may mitigate the risk of mis-disclosure by 
corporations. This would be relevant if stakeholders, like in the case of Nike discussed above, also 
have capacity to act in the space for shareholder enforcement. 
Although the mandatory disclosure of due diligence procedures, non-financial key performance 
indicators and ‘outcomes’ remains susceptible to self-assessed and broad-based reporting, which is 
not helped by the UK’s adoption of the term ‘description’ to all the elements of disclosure required, 
the availability of civil society templates and benchmarks provide to an extent, yardsticks for 
evaluating the quality of substantive compliance. These may also affect investor and regulators’ 
perception of what adequacy means for disclosure and could influence enforcement actions that 
relate to insufficient or mis-disclosure. The indirect form of procedural regulation brought in by the 
mandatory disclosure requirement encourages corporations to recognise the expectations of public 
accountability, and may entice them to adopt and bond themselves to socially developed standards 
and procedures. Such forging of a pluralistic governance system is promising for bringing about 
changes to corporate behaviour, as regulation provides the law-backed framework for compliance 
while bottom-up initiatives offer practical application in increasingly established and definite ways. 
Next we turn to corporate transparency in the UK in relation to modern slavery. This regime applies 
a similar mandatory disclosure approach but engages to a lesser extent with indirect procedural 
regulation. We argue that the relatively poorer engagement with indirect procedural regulation is a 
missed step in the UK in relation to the potential of achieving richer and more effective forms of 
governance as highlighted above. 
C. The UK’s Mandatory Disclosure Provision in the Modern Slavery Act 2015 
The UK enacted the Modern Slavery Act 2015 initially in response to combatting human trafficking 
crimes, but in the course of the debates over the draft Bill, campaigners110 sought to support greater 
corporate responsibility for supply chains and forced labour used therein. Hence, the Act now 
provides for certain corporations111 to make mandatory disclosure yearly of a ‘slavery and human 
trafficking statement’ (the Statement) in order to provide transparency on the steps that a 
corporation has taken to ensure that its business and its supply chain are free from slavery and 
human trafficking.112  Employment practices in the UK continue to be an issue of concern as in 2016, 
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abusive and illegal employment practices at large UK sports retailer Sports Direct came to light and 
became the subject of a Parliament Inquiry.113 
The Statement is less prescriptive in nature than the non-financial information statement discussed 
above. It refers to a list of matters similar to the non-financial information statement, but they are 
neither exhaustive nor mandatory. The list of matters includes: 
(a) the organisation’s structure, its business and its supply chains; 
(b) its policies in relation to slavery and human trafficking; 
(c) its due diligence processes in relation to slavery and human trafficking in its business and 
supply chains; 
(d) the parts of its business and supply chains where there is a risk of slavery and human 
trafficking taking place, and the steps it has taken to assess and manage that risk; 
(e) its effectiveness in ensuring that slavery and human trafficking is not taking place in its 
business or supply chains, measured against such performance indicators as it considers appropriate; 
and 
     (f) the training about slavery and human trafficking available to its staff. 
Section 54 provides that companies may include the matters listed for disclosure and this is clarified 
by the Ministry’s Practical Guidance as not being compulsory.114 The Practical Guidance emphasises 
that the Statement should encapsulate the steps taken by the company to prevent slavery and 
human trafficking in its business and supply chain. The Statement should also be in plain English, 
succinct and hence readily accessible. 
By being less prescriptive about the matters to be disclosed, the mandatory disclosure obligation in 
section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act does not arguably give rise to the same intensity of procedural 
regulation as discussed above. In fact section 54 is more akin to meta-regulation as firms are able to 
design their systems and processes in order to meet the broad requirement of ‘taking steps to 
prevent modern slavery and human trafficking’. Such reflexivity allows firms to apply the 
requirement flexibly within its business context, but as Wen argues, such a requirement may not 
prevent minimal or cosmetic demonstrations of processes and steps, especially as there is no 
obligation to bring in independent third party verification.115 Nevertheless, the Secretary of State has 
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the power to bring civil proceedings against any corporation to enforce the duties in section 54, 
which presumably includes the non-production of the Statement, or its inadequate production. 
There is some potential for the enforcement action to bring in a form of procedural governance, 
although its potency depends on how frequently it is brought and how it is framed. We are sceptical 
as to the potency of regulatory enforcement as the relevant regulator is the Home Office, which is 
tasked with more pressing social and crime enforcement responsibilities. It is possible that such 
enforcement could be carried out as part of a criminal enforcement action against a company for 
engaging in modern slavery, but we do not see the Home Office as an ongoing supervisor of 
companies’ procedural systems and governance, or perhaps as watchman for corporate behavioural 
change. Hence, we are of the view that it is important to enrol stakeholder scrutiny for companies’ 
internal governance and procedures, as well as their disclosure. 
We carried out a brief survey of the first batch of Modern Slavery Statements and argue that 
although companies aim to comply at a high standard, there is a lack of engagement with social 
expectations in that regard. This is possibly due to the weaker nature of procedural governance 
provided in the Act.  
The Table in Appendix 1 illustrates that the Statements largely converge on the list of matters 
required in the Act although that is not mandatory. A very cursory survey of sample firms in different 
sectors shows that they tend to treat the non-exhaustive list as a minimum template for disclosure. 
This practice secures some extent of comparability in the Statements produced. We find that 
companies rely solely on internally developed procedures to demonstrate due diligence and 
internally-generated performance indicators to assess outcomes. They do not seem to engage with 
stakeholder developed initiatives to reform procedural governance and do not demonstrate 
engagement with wider society expectations in this regard. We are of the view that the relatively 
weaker level of indirect procedural governance in the Act allows companies to be relatively insular, 
and does not go far enough to encourage companies to radically reform their internal procedures 
and governance. Although it may be argued that internal codes and procedures need not be inferior, 
they are still fundamentally self-generated and assessed, and not necessarily connected with notions 
of substantive quality consonant with social expectations.  
For our purposes this paper compares on a qualitative basis six Statements produced by UK 
companies, namely Marks & Spencer Plc116 in the apparel retail sector, McMullen & Sons Ltd117 in 
the restaurant and pub management sector, the Go-Ahead Group Plc118 in the public transportation 
sector operating Southeastern rail services and regional bus services, Sirka UK Limited119 in the 
building and construction sector, the Economist Group120 in the journalism sector and Associated 
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British Foods Plc121 in the food manufacturing, processing and distribution sector. This is a cursory 
survey only and the sectors have been selected for their potential to employ low wage workers in 
the UK and/or supply chains abroad. The companies are different in size, scale and economic 
footprint, showcasing at least an extent of variety in the small sample surveyed.  
The encouraging sign from this brief survey is that companies are cautious about even rather 
reflexive forms of regulation. They aim to show a form of compliance with procedural regulation, 
reflecting an awareness of the current climate where we see increasing juridification of corporate 
social responsibility issues. Companies perhaps recognise that such reflexive regulation can be a 
temporary state of affairs and can be scaled up towards more hardened forms of procedural 
regulation122 if they do not demonstrate change. However we also note that companies do not offer 
more disclosure than required under the non-exhaustive list of matters, and are especially short on 
specific risks where slavery or human trafficking may occur in the business or supply chain. This may 
be due to a fear of putting business-sensitive information into the public domain.  
We discern that all subjects of the survey take steps to prevent slavery and human trafficking 
according to their own internal codes and guidelines and do not rely on externally established codes 
or guidelines by civil society or international organisations. This insular approach is susceptible to 
cosmetic or minimal change in internal governance. In this regard we question whether a stronger 
form of procedural governance such as discussed earlier is needed to stimulate change in companies. 
Nevertheless, there may be cross-fertilisation for the quality of Modern Slavery Statements if listed 
companies already adopt a socially-focused business and human rights due diligence for example.  If 
a listed company complying with the Directive already institutes socially focused due diligence and 
social performance evaluation, there would be organisational efficiency reasons for streamlining 
their treatment the Modern Slavery statement. We see an opportunity for a larger-scale empirical 
survey, in a few years when data is available, comparing section 414CA reporting and modern 
slavery reporting. This would be important for determining the impact of strong forms of procedural 
regulation on corporate behaviour. 
D. Critical Reflections and Conclusion 
The increasing juridification of corporate social responsibility issues shows that what is regarded as 
‘voluntary’ and ‘good’ behaviour may become socially expected and legally enforceable behaviour. 
However, change to corporate behaviour is not easily achieved, borne out by the evolution of both 
policy and technique in corporate regulation over the decades. Reflexive forms of regulation and civil 
society-led governance may on their own be insufficiently influential, but a form of complementarity 
brought about by the reforms discussed can unleash potential to change corporate behaviour.  
We argue that the mandatory disclosure introduced in the non-financial information statement for 
EU and UK corporations123 brings in a form of procedural regulation subject to multi-faceted spheres 
                                                          
121 https://www.abmauri.com/modern_slavery_act.pdf. 
122 Discussed in Iris H-Y Chiu and Anna Donovan, ‘A New Milestone in Corporate Regulation: Procedural 
Legalisation, Standards of Transnational Corporate Behaviour and Lessons from Financial Regulation and Anti-
Bribery Regulation’ (2017) Journal of Corporate Law Studies, forthcoming. 
123 And other businesses with a public interest element as defined under the Directive. 
of accountability. In designing a form of procedural regulation under a mandatory disclosure 
framework, policy makers and civil society organisations continue to refine modern frameworks of 
governance in terms of aspects of softness and hardness along a spectrum that encourage effective 
change in behaviour. This approach departs from a market-based liberal framework that relies on 
investors to hold companies to account. Rather it seeks to empower stakeholders and civil society to 
engage with companies at an input level, influencing companies to adopt more socially-infused 
frameworks for due diligence and evaluating social performance.  
Such a governance design relies on polycentric dialogue and influence, and less on clearly defined 
enforcement processes. Regulators provide fundamental support in standard-setting and ensuring 
comparability. This may however be criticised as stakeholders are not formally empowered under 
company law to hold companies to account and disclosure regulation can be regarded as ultimately 
pandering to the capital markets.124 We see promise however in this form of input-based governance 
as facilitating learning-based behaviour. This form of reflexive governance marries the coercive 
power of mandatory transparency with civil society input and scrutiny into firms. However the UK’s 
mandatory disclosure requirement for modern slavery and human trafficking falls short of 
introducing a form of procedural regulation and it will be crucial to discern any difference in quality 
of reporting and internal governance that entails.  
We may argue that indirect procedural regulation subsumed under mandatory disclosure is a half-
hearted technique and does not go far enough to legalise corporate responsibilities. Why not 
institute directors’ duties to ensure procedural compliance,125 or as Taylor suggests, implement the 
proposal mooted by the French to impose a duty of care for business responsibility on parent 
corporations so that they may be liable for the negative externalities their activities generate?126 We 
acknowledge that this governance technique skirts rather than reforms the heart of corporate law, 
and is by the no means the silver bullet or final word on effecting corporate social responsibility.127 It 
however allows regulation to penetrate the inner workings of corporations and offers more 
transparency and potential engagement for stakeholders and civil society. This could make a stealthy 
inroad into the Anglo-American shareholder-centric corporate law model in the UK.  
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